{"id":1786,"date":"2014-09-08T15:09:21","date_gmt":"2014-09-08T22:09:21","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/blog.mozilla.org\/security\/?p=1786"},"modified":"2016-09-30T02:51:44","modified_gmt":"2016-09-30T09:51:44","slug":"phasing-out-certificates-with-1024-bit-rsa-keys","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blog.mozilla.org\/security\/2014\/09\/08\/phasing-out-certificates-with-1024-bit-rsa-keys\/","title":{"rendered":"Phasing out Certificates with 1024-bit RSA Keys"},"content":{"rendered":"

For many years, Mozilla<\/a>, NIST<\/a>, the CA\/Browser Forum<\/a>, and others<\/a> have been encouraging Certification Authorities (CAs) to upgrade their 1024-bit RSA keys to a stronger cryptographic algorithm (either longer RSA keys or ECDSA). We are actively working with CAs to retire SSL and Code Signing certificates that have 1024-bit RSA keys in an effort to make the upgrade as orderly as possible, and to avoid having system administrators find themselves in emergency mode because their SSL keys were compromised. Our multi-pronged approach includes removing the SSL and Code Signing trust bits<\/a> from 1024-bit root certificates in NSS<\/a>, gathering telemetry about end-entity certificates with 1024-bit RSA keys, and then eventually showing an “Untrusted Connection<\/a>” error when a certificate in the chain has an RSA key that is less than 2048 bits.<\/p>\n

To help with migration off of 1024-bit root certificates, we are making changes in phases. The first phase involved removing or turning off trust bits for the following 1024-bit root certificates in Firefox 32.<\/p>\n

In Firefox 32, the following 1024-bit CA certificates were either removed, or their SSL and Code Signing trust bits were turned off:<\/p>\n